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Auke J.J. van Breemen & Janos J. Sarbo
The Machine in the Ghost: The Syntax of Mind
Abstract
Experience with static, fact-based Knowledge Representation (KR) in past
decades has revealed its limitations: it is inflexible (for adjustments) and
non-portable (knowledge in one domain cannot be directly used in another
domain). We believe that dynamical, process-based KR offers better per-
spectives. Below we start our presentation with a philosophically informed
underpinning of a process view of KR. The most important conclusion of
this enterprise is that the processes of perception and cognition can be
modeled in the same way. This part is followed by the introduction of a
cognitively based, semiotically inspired model of KR that complies with
our philosophical considerations. As computer science in its core meaning
is necessarily fact oriented, due to the limitations of current computers,
the proposed theory of KR is based in logic, but this logic is less articulate
than predicate calculus (regarded as a language for the specification of re-
cursively computable functions). Note that it is a limitation of syntax, not
of expressive power. In knowledge representation, in the broader sense,
including problem elicitation and specification, the restricted syntax may
turn out to be more practical than the whole (i.e. predicate calculus).
Keywords: Knowledge representation, information process, logica utens,
semiotics, Peirce
1 Introduction; theoretical background
In man the task oriented ‘interpreting system’ and his ‘knowledge systems’ are intertwined.
It is in the course of history that knowledge representations were devised that exist in
artifacts1 and so the KR became severed from the interpretational system. Part of the
knowledge representations explicitly aimed at capturing reasoning processes as is witnessed
by the history of logic.2 Eventually this led to a view of logic as an abstract calculus that
is devoid of empirical content, depending on set theory for its extensional, semantical
interpretation.3
1.1 Received view: ontology and representation
L. Wittgenstein furnished a prototypical example of this approach in his Tractatus Logico
Philosophicus. With his picture theory of meaning, or also, correspondence theory of truth,
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he provided a world view that is intimately connected with an extensional interpretation
of the logical calculus. Although nowadays his philosophy regarded as a system has lost
appeal, a basic trait of it is still quite common in thought about modeling and ontology
in information science. It sets off with the conviction that there are two useful kinds
of sentences: the tautologies of logic that provide the form on the one hand and the
interpreted logical forms that state facts on the other. Along these lines a model, if true,
represents part of reality. Based on this distinction between types of sentences is the
belief that ontological work is concerned with a specification of the entities covered by
statements of fact or, in other words, domain specific ontologies. If there is attention for
distinctions of being at a more general level, than it is focused on the representational
primitives of extensional logic or general ontology. T. Gruber nicely illustrates this line of
thinking in information sciences when he writes (Gruber, 2008):
In the context of computer and information sciences, an ontology defines a set
of representational primitives with which to model a domain of knowledge or
discourse. [. . .] In the context of database systems, ontology can be viewed as
a level of abstraction of data models, analogous to hierarchical and relational
models, but intended for modeling knowledge about individuals, their attributes
and their relationship to other individuals.
It must be admitted that Wittgenstein intended to cover all of reality while Gruber
modestly states that ontology in computer science is a technical term. The scheme of
thinking, however, is the same: propositions form the key entrance to ontological thinking.
But what if the formation of the proposition is the true ground on which to base the most
general ontology?
In subsequent criticism of the picture theory Wittgenstein offers a line of thought that
is worth to be mentioned here. In the Tractatus sentences that picture state of affairs
were deemed meaningful if in a complete analysis of such a sentence the names that occur
in the resulting atomic sentences are proxies of atomic objects. As the objects configure
to form states of affairs, the atomic sentences configure to complex sentences that mirror
those state of affairs. This mirroring relation puts the judge that has to compare sentences
with states of affairs outside the system.
In the Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein, 1971) Wittgenstein shifts from a
detached view to a more inside perspective. The meaning of an expression no longer
depends solely on the pictured facts: instead meaning is determined by the role the
expression plays in the language game in which it figures. Uttering a sentence is like
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doing a move in a game of chess. Using language is rule governed. Learning language is
learning to do the right moves and picturing facts is only one of the families of games, that
has to be sub-divided according to its variant forms on top of that. And the foundational
role of logic is at hazard.
The development of Wittgenstein’s thought may be interesting for its own sake. Here,
however, we only hinted at it because it is an efficient way to state the problem we face in
general terms and next to point to the fact that in information science a similar tension
between a fact oriented semantics and an act oriented semantics can be discerned. Maybe
the tension can be resolved if only we can find a logic that is more foundational than the
extensional calculus and are able to construct a method of modeling with it that respects
the demands of representing facts and the demands of representing acts of interpretation.
Again a small detour along the road of philosophy may prove efficient in our attempt to
make clear the direction in which we seek our solution.
As a start we point to a distinction J. Bentham made between two different kinds of on-
tology.4 The first type is idioscopic ontology. Its task is to investigate (skopeo=look at)5
the properties that are peculiar to each of the different classes of being (idios=separate,
distinct). The second form of ontology is cenoscopic ontology. Its task is to study the
properties that all things have in common (koinos=common). Bentham’s distinction
differs, due to his nominalistic world view, from the one Gruber provides –the above men-
tioned domain specific ontologies and the ontological work on representational primitives–
except for the distinction between a special and a general ontology. So, let’s forget about
the content Bentham provided, just keep the distinction and fill in on the idioscopic part
of the distinction Gruber’s domain specific ontologies. That leaves us with the question
what alternatives there are for the representational primitives in the cenoscopic part of
ontology.
1.2 A central precursor: I. Kant
I. Kant is a precursor of Gruber’s interpretation of a general ontology as dealing with
representational primitives. His starting point is an investigation of the different kinds
of judgments (propositions) with which we think about objects (Kant, 1956). He comes
up with a table of four dimensions (Quantity, Quality, Relation, Modality) with three
subdivisions in each. See fig. 1.
The idea is that each judgment, if classified will score in each of the dimensions on
one of the sub-divisions. In order to be applicable to objects Kant generalized the table of
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universal
Quantity
particular
singularQuality
Modality
problematic
assertoric
apodictic
negative
affirmative
infinite
Relation
categorical
hypothetical
disjunctive
Figure 1: Kant’s table of judgments
unity
Quantity
plurality
totalityQuality
Modality
possibility
existence
Relation
inherence and subsistence
causality and dependence
community (reciprocity)
reality
negation
limitation
necessity
Figure 2: Kant’s table of categories
judgments in a table of categories of being. The names for the categories (most general
cenoscopic categories or short list) are the same as the names for the dimensions. The
sub-divisions (one level less general cenoscopic categories or long list) however differ. See
fig. 2.
Ch. S. Peirce recognized early in life that we can’t start with the proposition in our
quest for the most general categories. He also endorsed the idea that categories have to
be founded on formal logic, but the table Kant presented did not convince him since he
found to many faults in and interrelations between the different categorical sub-divisions
(CP 1.545-1.548)6. He concluded that there must be a more general level at which
we have to search for categories. That is what led him to search in the direction of
a generalization of Kant’s sub-divisions in threefolds. His assumption is that if we are
looking for truly universal conceptions, we have to find out what is needed to bring the
manifold of sensuous impressions or the content of consciousness to (the) unity (of the
proposition). It is in the formation of the proposition, not just the result, the proposition
itself, where we have to look. The formation of the proposition, as we will show later,
can be analyzed as a less developed kind of argument or inference.
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1.3 Ontology and interpretation
At this point we will not embark on a long journey into the depths of Peirce’s philosophy
in order to delve up the many shades of the categories he discerns in a systematic way.
Instead we hook on to Kant’s work and we will only present the results, not the derivation.
Since, on top of that, the presentation is written form the post hoc perspective of Peirce’s
mature classification of the science’s (CP 1.180-1.283) the treatment is not only superficial
but also clearly not intended to be taken as a contribution to the understanding of Peirce’s
intellectual development.7
On the most general level the three categories resemble the sub-divisions of Kant’s
category of Quantity. They state differences in relational properties without any content:
The first is that whose being is simply in itself, not referring to anything nor
lying behind anything. The second is that which is what it is by force of
something to which it is second. The third is that which is what it is owing
to things between which it mediates and which it brings into relation to each
other (CP 1.356).
Two remarks must be made here. First, categories of a lower ordinal number are
involved in higher order categories, but not the reverse. Second, the category of Thirdness
is the highest order category we need, because, in the Peircean view of categories, all still
higher order relations can be reduced to a compound of triadic relations. We cannot do
with less than Thirdness since a reduction of a triad to two dyads would eliminate the
mediative character of Thirds. An example might illustrate this. Imagine the sudden
appearance of strokes of pain. Eventually you locate it as a pain in a molar. The pain
and the relation of the pain with its object (the molar) were there before you recognized,
by an interpreting thought, the pain as a tooth ache. It is only through the thought that
relates the pain to the molar that the pain is hypothetically recognized as a tooth ache
caused by the molar.
Applied to consciousness the categories gain content, here a resemblance with Kant’s
sub-divisions of Quality prevails:
[. . .] first, feeling, the consciousness which can be included with an instant of
time, passive consciousness of quality, without recognition or analysis; second,
consciousness of an interruption into the field of consciousness, sense of resis-
tance, of an external fact, of another something (italics added by the authors);
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third, synthetic consciousness, binding time together, sense of learning, thought
(CP 1.377).
The phrase we italicized may seem ill placed since the introduction of an object, as
the cause of an interruption in the field of consciousness, is a result of operations of
the synthetic consciousness, which task it is to glue successions of feelings together
by providing explanations for the patterns in which they emerge. From this it follows
that, strictly speaking, the attribution of objecthood as well as the ascription of external
factuality is hypothetical and not pre-given. This however is not the direction of Peirce’s
thought here. Here he just distinguishes three different kinds of consciousness and feels
compelled, in order to do so, to point to elements that only can become manifest by
analyzing more developed stages of thought. Elsewhere, in the context of discussions on
logic, he distinguishes the consciousness of quality, the sense of resistance and the sense
of thought as quale consciousness (cf. CP. 6.230), consciousness of discrimination and
consciousness of origin respectively (cf. CP 3.63). Since in higher order categories the
lower ordered categories are involved, thought involves (consciousness of) discrimination
and (consciousness of) qualities.
In the domain of representation the categories are applied to communication (between
two persons or one person communicating with its future self in a stretch of time). It
is the domain of the transfer and growth of thought, which, if signs didn’t exist, would
remain barren. Because this makes the sign concept of paramount importance, the first
step we need to take is to find out the general nature of signs. Peirce provided several
definitions, a representative one is the following.
A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic
relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third,
called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which
it stands itself to the same Object (CP 2.274).
A sign only fulfills its duty if it actually raises an interpretant thought. A representamen
that is not regarded as actually standing in relation to an object only entails the possibility
of becoming a sign. A sign that is regarded to stand in relation with an object, is existing
as a sign, but as long as it does not give rise to an interpretant, it still does not actualize
its sign function and thus is not a real sign (note the similarity with the subdivisions
of Kant’s category of modality, necessity being screwed down a little). From the above
it follows that if we want to analyze signs and information processes we have to take
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the monadic (sign in itself), the dyadic (sign–object, sign–interpretant) and the triadic
relations (sign–object–interpretant) into account. It is possible to analyze the monadic
aspect without paying attention to the dyadic and triadic relations, but the reverse is not
possible because lower order categories are involved in higher ordered categories and have
to be accounted for in the analysis of the later.
It is easily possible to enlarge the list of triadic categorical orderings each exemplifying
another shade of the most basic concepts. What is more important, however, is that from
these three basic categories Peirce develops his cenoscopic ontology in a systematic way by
applying the categorical distinctions to themselves. Thus forging tools suited to analyze
the process of interpretation, which in computer science can be adapted for systematic
(ontological) specification. The three basic categories are Peirce’s short list, equal to a
generalization of the headings of Kant’s sub-categories. The repeated application of the
basic categories to signs, with the aim of finding out their most general characteristics,
yields the long list of categories (categorical aspects). This Peircean cenoscopic science
of signs, dedicated to an investigation of the representational primitives is more widely
known as semiotics.8
We get the long list by recognizing that in phenomenology a feeling is truly monadic,
present only for an instant and after that forever gone, but a representamen is not. A
representamen is, so to speak, more persistent and entails the possibility of a relation with
object and interpretant. A representamen is of a first category only relative to a second
(its object) and a third (its interpretant). It is not on its own account a first category
kind of being, as with a feeling, but on account of the relations it partakes in. What
in one context is a representamen can be an interpretant or object in another, as, for
instance, when we talk about a model itself. This more complicated character of signs
can be analyzed in a very general way that specifies the rules the sub-categories must
comply with:
1. [monadic aspect of signs] A sign regarded in itself involves a trichotomy. This yields
the first three terms for the long list, covering the representamen itself. We number
them 1.1, 1.2, 1.3. We use the first number for the category and the second for the
categorical aspect.
2. [dyadic aspects of signs] The two dyadic relations of a sign –1st the relation of a sign
to its object and 2nd the relation of a sign to its interpretant– can each be analyzed in
two trichotomic relations. This yields six terms for the long list, three terms for each
dyadic relation. We number them 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 if they belong to the relation between
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sign and object and 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 for the relation between sign and interpretant.
3. [triadic sign relation] In order to produce an interpretant that assumes the same
triadic relation to its object as the sign itself stands, no new terms are needed, but a
process has to be run through in which all nine categorical terms, or alternatively, all
nine sign aspects of the long list are involved. This is a consequence of the assumption
that lower ordered (sub-)categories are involved in higher ordered (sub-)categories.
The long list of nine categories can be put to use in two directions. First, we can model
the interpretation process that generates new signs. If we do this, then we are in need of
all nine categorical aspects, as will be shown in sect. 4. We will call them sign aspects.
They do not exist on their own outside the process. Second, we may ask whether different
kinds of signs may result from the interpretative process, capable of entering new instances
of interpretative processes. On the basis of the above analysis of signs, a sign type can
be defined by giving three sign aspects, one out of each of the three categories. Following
the rule that lower categories are involved in higher, but not the reverse, some constraints
must be applied. A lower categorical aspect of a lower category cannot form a sign type
together with a higher categorical aspect of a higher category (1.1, 2.2, 3.1 can not form
a sign type, 1.1, 2.1, 3.1 do). The result is a list of 10 different sign types out of the
27 possible combinations. Since, in this article we will concentrate on the interpretative
process and not on the sign types, we will close this subject with the remark that, since
the ten sign types can be projected on different stages of our interpretation model, the
lexical items in the library can be sorted according to type in terms of the interpretative
model. Representation and interpretation are thus brought in a systematic relation. Later,
see sect. 4.3.1, we will give an exposition of Peirce’s long list of categories, here we would
like to point to the fact that here we have an alternative interpretation of what counts
as cenoscopic ontology that goes, so to speak, one ply deeper than approaches that take
the predicate calculus as their point of departure. A nice feat of this approach is that it
is systematic, by providing principles to build the system, and that it is dynamic, in the
sense that it provides a model for the process and not just for the result of information
processes.
Before we proceed a last remark about the relation between logic and the interpreta-
tional process is in order. The logic on which Gruber bases his ontology of representational
primitives is the logic we learn in school. Peirce coined this the ‘logica docens’. This logic
grew out of the logic that uncritically is used in our everyday mental operations, the
‘logica utens’. This logic is generalized by us and interpreted as a procedure. The result
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we call ‘naive’ logic (see Appendix B). Thus we try in our Knowledge in Formation (KiF)9
research program to push the logical approach one step further by taking the interpreting
system as our point of departure instead of the representational system.
1.4 Outline
Interpretation, in our approach, starts at the moment something knocks at our mind.
Here it is convenient not to focus on the question what mind is and how it is to be
distinguished from the senses and from consciousness. Instead we ask what it is that
knocks at our mind. Our, and Peirce’s, answer, that qualia do the knocking, is akin to
the answer provided by V.S. Ramachandran and W. Hirstein (1997). Qualia, according
to them, are
[...] the ‘raw feels’ of conscious experience: the painfulness of pain, the redness
of red. Qualia give human conscious experience the particular character it
has. For instance, imagine a red square; that conscious experience has (at
least) two qualia: a color quale, responsible for your sensation of redness, and
a shape quale, responsible for the square appearance of the imagined object
(idem, pp. 437-438).
According to (Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1997) three laws apply to qualia:
(1) Qualia are irrevocable on the input side.
(2) What you can do with qualia is open ended (flexibility on the output side).
(3) Qualia must be retained long enough to enable subsequent processing.
Later on in the article the authors refine their view by distinguishing between perceived
and imagined qualia. The experiential difference between the two types consists in the
more vivid character of the experienced qualia. A consequence of this difference is that
we can distinguish between what is independent of our mind and what is generated by
it. A faculty that greatly enhances our chances of survival. There is more to it since
the imagined qualia are, as a rule, far more vague10 and can be exchanged according
to purpose, although only in stretches of time. But, the processes of perception and
cognition both rely on qualia that obey the aforementioned laws.
Peircean semiotic theory is too general and in too unfinished a state,11 to be directly
used for the development of a model for interpretational processes (semiotic model), let
alone a computational one. Falling back on the underlying logica utens in a straightforward
way is impossible because Peirce mainly uses the term to indicate the habits of reasoning
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that grow naturally, i.e. without the aid of a logica docens, in the course of life, like, as
he puts it “[...] the analytical mechanics resident in the billiard player’s nerves” (cf. CP
1.623). He did not try to formulate the basic program of the mind in terms of a logica
utens (‘naive’ logical model). Because such a logic provides a promising avenue to a
computational model of interpretation, we had to formulate one ourselves. In order to be
able to do so, we needed to construct a model in which the interpretation moments are
described and ordered in a very general description of the process, one which is as close
as possible to the assumed working of cognitive activity (relations on qualia or relational
model).
types
interpretant
aspects
sign‘naive’ logicalrelations
expressionson qualia
of cognitive activity
process model
of informative processes
semiotic model
Figure 3: The isomorphic models of information processing
In this paper we will start (see fig. 3) with a process interpretation of cognitive activity,
summarized in the relational model (sect. 2), already here we will distinguish the process
of perception (sect. 2.1.1) from the process of cognition (sect. 2.1.2). We proceed by
providing a logical interpretation of the relational model (sect. 3). In the next section
(sect. 4) we provide a systematic 12 interpretation of Peirce’s semiotic thought from the
perspective of the model introduced before. Starting from the definition of a sign we
introduce the different aspects a sign must have, according to Peirce, in order to be
able to realize its sign function (sect. 4.1). After this is done the focus shifts from signs
to the process of their interpretation (sect. 4.2). We provide the interpretant aspects
distinguished by Peirce and complete his list of aspects (sect. 4.3). After the introduction
of our theory, we shortly deal with questions of application (sect. 5.2) and we finish the
article with conclusions and possibilities for further research (sect. 6). In the Appendix
finally we briefly sketch the secondary literature on Peirce and provide a definition of our
‘naive’ logic.
2 Towards a model of cognitive activity
We assume that the ‘real’ world consists of phenomena that are interactions between
entities which are in principle independent and that knowledge arises from observations
of such phenomena, by means of signs. Note that entities that are not independent
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(from a certain point of view) may not interact (from that point of view). For example,
mixing paints of the same color may not appear as a color-phenomenon; we will not
‘see’ any difference. However, mixing paints may increase mass, which may appear as a
mass-phenomenon.
An ‘observation’ or the actual meaning of a phenomenon is an interpretation of the
interaction between an observed phenomenon and an observer, as an event. By considering
the observer to be an interpreting system occurring in some ‘state’ at the moment of the
interaction, the change brought about by the ‘effect’ due to the observed phenomenon
can be interpreted as a ‘transition’ of the system’s state to a next state. This includes
the reaction by an interpreting system on the input effect as a stimulus. For example, if
we observe the qualities of a bursting smoke (stimulus), then running away may be our
reaction, interpreting smoke as a sign of danger.
Phenomena are interactions between independent qualities. Such interrelated and, at
the same time, independent qualities we call dual qualities or a duality. There may be any
number of qualities involved in an interaction, but, according to the theory of this paper,
those qualities are always distinguished by cognition in two collections, state and effect,
and, consequently, are treated as single entities.13 As the real world is inherently dynamic,
phenomena interpreted as signs may themselves become qualities in a subsequent inter-
action. The dynamic character of phenomena is acknowledged in this paper, by modeling
interpretation as a process, representing interactions by means of other interactions, in a
recursive fashion.
2.1 Processing schema
Cognitive information processing by the brain can be modeled as follows (Solso, 1988).
By virtue of the change caused by the appearing stimulus, the input qualities are sampled
by the senses in a collection of qualia, called a percept14 (Harnad, 1987), (Stillings, 1998).
In a single operation, the brain compares the current percept with the previous one, and
this enables it to distinguish between two sorts of input qualities: one, which was there
and remained there, which can be called a ‘state’; and another, which, though it was not
there, is there now, which can be called an ‘effect’.15
The reaction of an interpreting system is determined by its knowledge of the properties
of the external stimulus (which other qualities it may co-occur with in an interaction) and
its experience with earlier response strategies (habits). Such knowledge is an expression
of the system’s potential for interpreting, i.e. combining with, a type of input effect. This
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potential depends on the system’s state. These properties, which are stored in memory,
we call the ‘combinatory’ properties of the input qualia or the complementary information
defining the context of the observation. The input state and effect qualia (input qualia),
and the context (which too is assumed to be present as a collection of qualia) collectively
define the input for cognitive information processing by the brain.
The primary task of cognitive processing is the interpretation of the input qualia, in the
light of their combinatory properties. Since the input for cognitive processing is assumed
to consist of state (qs), effect (qe) and context (C) qualia, appearing in a ‘primordial
soup’ ([qs qe C]), the stages of recognition can be defined as a processing schema, as
follows (see also fig. 4). Below, square brackets are used to indicate that an entity is not
yet interpreted as a sign; no bracketing or the usual bracket symbols indicate that some
interpretation is already available.
(1) the identification of the different types of qualia in the ‘primordial soup’
sorting : [qs], [qe], [C]
(2) the separation of the collections of state and effect qualia
abstraction: qs, qe
(3) the linking of the qualia with their combinatory properties ([C])
complementation: (qs,C), (qe,C)
(4) the establishment of a relation between the completed qualia
predication: (qs,C)–(qe,C)
Sorting may be explained as an operation in which the different types of qualia, con-
stituting the input, are identified in the ‘primordial soup’. For example, [qs] is a represen-
tation of the input state qualia, accompanied by the remaining qualia of the ‘primordial
soup’. Abstraction is an operation representing the input state and effect qualia, sep-
arately from one another, as independent entities. Complementation is an operation
representing the input qualia in context. Predication is an operation in which the input
is represented as a reason or, a ‘reaction’ by the interpreting system. It explains why this
effect occurs to this state.
The above model of cognitive activity, first presented in (Farkas & Sarbo, 2000),
represents the input interaction by other interactions, in a recursive fashion. On the
first or ‘sensory’ level, the interaction between the external stimulus and the observer is
represented as a ‘primordial soup’. The interaction between the collections of different
types of qualia of the ‘primordial soup’ ([qs qe C]) or the interaction of the input with
itself, is represented by [qs], [qe], and [C]. The interaction between the sorted state [qs]
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s
(1)  sorting
(3)  complementation
(4)  predication
(2)  abstraction
e
es
s
s e
e
e
s
(q  ,C)
[C] q 
[q ][q ]
[q   q   C]
(q  ,C)
q 
(q  ,C)
(q  ,C) −
Figure 4: A schematic diagram of cognitive processing. A horizontal line designates an
interaction, a diagonal a dependency relation (in step (2), there are relations between qs and
[qe], and between [qs] and qe, but since they are used for separating collections from each other,
these dependencies are omitted).
and effect [qe] is represented by qs and qe; the respective interactions between these two
and the context ([C]), by (qs,C) and (qe,C). Finally, the interaction between (qs,C) and
(qe,C) is represented by the final interpretation moment, (qs,C)–(qe,C). Note that the final
representation itself may be interpreted as a quale, in a subsequent interpretation process.
The important conclusion of the above analysis is that each of the interpretation moments
indicated by (1)-(4) can be defined as an interaction between neighboring interpretation
moments. Such interactions are indicated in fig. 4 by horizontal lines.
There are two collections of input qualia, state and effect, that have to be interpreted
(i) in relation to the context and (ii) in relation to each other. In the next section we will
show that the two interpretations can be realized by means of two processes, which we
call (i) perception and (ii) cognition.16 In addition we show that these processes can be
defined as isomorphic instances of the processing schema.
2.1.1 Perception
The ‘goal’ of perception, as a process, is the establishment of a relation between the
input qualia and the memory (see fig. 5). The memory contains information about the
properties of the input qualia, independently from their actual relations (which qualia may
co-occur with which other qualia in an interaction). In this process, the relation between
the input qualia themselves is of secondary importance. An example for a perception
process, in language processing, is lexical analysis.
In the model of perception, state and effect type input qualia are indicated by a and
b, respectively; memory response or context qualia by a’ and b’ . All four signs may refer
to a type as well as a collection of qualia.
Among the representations17 obtained by perception, only step 4, the final one is of
interest for this section. Following the assumption that memory response is determined
by the input qualia, a’ (b’ ) arise by means of a(b) qualia that trigger memory. Although
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(3) complementation
(4) predication
(1) sorting
(2) abstraction
a+a’, b+b’
(b,b’)(a,a’)
a*a’, b*b’
[b][a]
a b[a’,b’]
[a b a’ b’]
Figure 5: A schematic diagram of perception as a process. Qualia comprising the input state
and effect, as well as the complementary memory response appear in a ‘primordial soup’ ([a b a’
b’ ]). The relation between input and memory response (which are independent and, therefore,
may interact) is represented by the expressions: a∗a’ , a+a’ , b∗b’ , b+b’ (the symbols ‘∗’ and ‘+’
designate a relation in the sense of agreement and possibility, respectively).
the two types of memory response signs are independent, they have a shared common
meaning. This is due to the fact that there is an interaction between the two types of input
qualia and that memory information stored by the brain arises from earlier observations
via memorization.
Activation of the memory, defining the actual state of the brain/mind, as an interpret-
ing system, enables us to distinguish between qualia in the memory response having an
intensity (i) above or (ii) below threshold. The two responses refer to input qualia which
either are in the brain’s focus (i) or complementary (ii). A high intensity type (i) memory
response signifies the recognition of the input as an agreement relation between the input
and memory response: the input a(b) is recognized or ‘known’ as a’ (b’ ). A low intensity
response of type (ii) refers to input recognition as a possibility relation only: the input
a(b) is not recognized or ‘not known’ as a’ (b’ ). In this case, the memory response only
represents it as a secondary or even less important aspect of the input qualia.
By indicating the first type of intensity relationship between input and memory re-
sponse by a ‘∗’ symbol, and the second type by a ‘+’, the signs of perception can be
represented as: a∗a’ , a+a’ , b∗b’ , b+b’ . For example, a∗a’ is a representation of a positive
identification of a by a’ , as opposed to a+a’ which signifies the event of the identification
of a possible meaning of a by a’ (in other words, a denial of a positive identification). In
the model of perception, as a process, the four signs are represented as a single sign. An
interpretation of the difference between the four intensity relations is beyond the scope of
this process (the ‘,’ symbol separating them above is an expression of their synonymous
interpretation as the final signs of perception; it is this perspective that makes them
synonymous).
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2.1.2 Cognition
The second process, cognition, is an exact copy of the first one, perception, except that
the ‘goal’ of cognition is the construction of a relation between the input qualia. More
specifically it concerns the settlement of a relation between the qualia that are in focus
(a∗a’ , b∗b’ ), in the light of those that are complementary (a+a’ , b+b’ ). Now it is the
relation between the input qualia and the memory that is of secondary importance. In
accordance with cognition’s ‘goal’, the context ([C]) contains relational information about
the input qualia (note that this process defines its own value of the context). This means
that by combining the input of the cognition process with the information of the context,
the relation between a∗a’ and b∗b’ (and, transitively so, the relation between a and b)
may be revealed.18
As with the perception process, the input appears in cognition as a ‘primordial soup’,
this time defined by the synonymous final signs of perception. In fact, the difference
between the four meaning elements (a∗a’ , a+a’ , b∗b’ , b+b’ ) functions as the ground for
the process of cognition. This is acknowledged in our model, by introducing an initial
re-presentation of the four relations generated by perception: a∗a’ as A, a+a’ as ¬A,
b∗b’ as B and b+b’ as ¬B. The presence or absence of a ‘¬’ symbol in an expression
indicate whether the qualia signified, are or are not in focus, i.e. identified (accordingly,
‘¬’ may be interpreted as a ‘relative difference’ operation with respect to the collection
of a type of qualia, represented as a set). The instantiation of the processing schema for
cognition is depicted in fig. 6.
(1)  sorting
(3)  complementation
(4)  predication
(2)  abstraction
[A] [B]
[A B ~A ~B]
A
(A,~B) − (B,~A)
[~A,~B] B
(A,~B) (B,~A)
Figure 6: A schematic diagram of cognition as a process. The input, appearing as a ‘primordial
soup’, is sorted ([A], [B], [¬A,¬B] ), abstracted (A, B), complemented by the context ((A,¬B),
(B,¬A)) and, combined in a single representation ((A,¬B)−(B,¬A)) by means of predication
(‘¬’ is denoted by a ‘∼’ symbol).
The important interpretation moment now is step 3 (complementation), in which a
link between the input qualia and the context is established in accordance with cognition’s
‘goal’ as well as with the duality of phenomena. This explains why there can be a relation
between A and ¬B, and ¬A and B, and why there is no relation between A and ¬A, or
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B and ¬B.19 The cognition process is completed by establishing a relation between A
and B, in step 4 (predication).
3 Logical analysis
The above model of cognition suggests the completeness of this process (all possibly
meaningful relations between A, B, ¬A, ¬B are considered). A ‘naive’ logical analysis
of the processing schema greatly enhances the force of this suggestion. In this section we
make an attempt to elaborate such an analysis, on the basis of the model of cognition
introduced above, but the results apply to the model of perception as well. Our analysis
consists in two parts. In the first part, a ‘naive’ logical expression is associated with each
interpretation moment by making use of common logical aspects. In this analysis, the term
‘logical’ is used to refer to an aspect of an event or an expression, not to a formally defined
concept. In the second part, operations are introduced, generating those expressions
according to a procedure. Accordingly, in this analysis, the term ‘logical’ receives a
procedural interpretation. Besides we present definitions illustrating the possibility for
those expressions to be generated by a procedure. That procedure is what we call ‘naive’
logic. As for the rest of this paper the existence of such a procedure can be sufficient,
therefore the second part of our analysis, which is more technical, is moved to Appendix B.
Since the focus of this section is on ‘naive’ logic, the prefix ‘naive’ can be omitted.
The hidden agenda of this section is a tacit introduction of logical concepts in the
process model of cognition. What makes the use of such concepts especially important
is that they have a well-studied, precise meaning. An essential element of the logical
interpretation of the process model of cognition is the abstraction of a common meaning
for the two different types of input qualia (state and effect), which is the concept of a
logical variable. By virtue of the duality of the input qualia, the logical interpretation
of cognition, as a process, requires the introduction of two variables, which we denote
by A and B. The difference between qualia that are in focus and those that are com-
plementary, is represented by the difference in their expression. Each of the two types
of qualia is referred to by means of a logical variable which is either stated positively
or negatively. Perceived state and effect qualia which are in focus are indicated by A
and B, respectively; those which are complementary by ¬A and ¬B. Note the use of
‘¬’ as a complementation operation on collections interpreted as sets. For example, the
complementary sub-collections of A-type qualia are denoted by A and ¬A (the label A
is used ambiguously).
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The relational operators introduced in the application of the processing schema for
perception (‘+’ for possibility, ‘∗’ for agreement), are inherited by the process model of
cognition and its interpretation as operations on expressions. In the definition of the
logical expressions below we make use of the fact that the logical ‘or’ is involved in the
meaning of possibility (‘+’) and the logical ‘and’ involved in the meaning of agreement
(‘∗’).
Conform the above mapping, the logical expressions associated with the events of the
cognitive process may be defined in the following way.
[qs]=A+B, [qe]=A∗B: the expression of the simultaneous presence of the input qualia
which are in focus, as a simple, possible co-existence (A+B) and as a meaningful co-
occurrence, in the sense of agreement (A∗B). As A and B are commonly interpreted
as logical variables, the separate representation of any one of the two types of input
qualia contains a reference to both variables. However, as we may only observe a
state by virtue of an effect, the occurrence of an effect always entails the existence of
a state. This difference between the two types of input qualia is expressed by means
of the difference between their two types of relations, represented by the operators
‘+’ and ‘∗’.
qs=A∗¬B, ¬A∗B: the expression of the abstract meaning of the focused input qualia,
as constituents, irrespective of the actually co-occurring other type of qualia. It is
this perspective that makes the two logical signs synonymous (note the use of ‘,’ in
the definition of qs directly above, as a representation of this equivalence).
qe=A∗¬B+¬A∗B: the expression of the input qualia as an abstract co-occurrence, log-
ically represented by a compatibility relation of the two types of abstract constituents
of the input (which are now interpreted differently).
[C]=¬A+¬B, ¬A∗¬B: the expression of the context as a possible co-existence (¬A+¬B)
and as a meaningful co-occurrence relation (¬A∗¬B) of the complementary qualia.
The synonymous representation of these signs is an expression of their secondary
(complementary) meaning, but also of the shared meaning included in the simultane-
ously present qualia, represented by ¬A and ¬B, underlying the context ([C]).
(qs,C)=A+¬B, ¬A+B: the expression of the abstract constituents (qs) completed with
the information provided by the context ([C]) or, alternatively, the ‘actual’ or embed-
ded meaning of the input qualia as constituents. For example, the actual meaning of
A (perceived state) as a constituent, is signified by A itself and by ¬B, the comple-
mentary property connecting A with B (as the relation between A and B is not yet
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abstraction
complementation
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or and
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excl.
Peirce
Sheffer,
proposition
inhibi−
equiv−
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logical variableA,B,~A,~B
~A+~B,
~A*~B
A+B A*B
A+~B,~A+B
A is B
A*B+~A*~B
A*~B+~A*BA*~B,~A*B
Figure 7: The logical expressions of cognitive processing (on the left) and the corresponding
Boolean relations (on the right). Negation (‘¬’) is denoted by a ‘∼’ symbol. Horizontal lines
in the left-hand side diagram denote a relation (interaction) between neighboring expressions.
established, the B type qualia cannot contribute to the actual meaning of A, as a
constituent). Alternatively, the meaning of ¬A∗B in context is defined by the qualia
completing this abstract meaning, which are A and ¬B. As the two interpretations
of A as an actual constituent are related to each other by the relation of co-existence,
the logical meaning of (qs,C) can be represented by A+¬B. For the same reason, as
in qs, the two expressions of (qs,C) are interpreted in the model, as synonymous.
(qe,C)=A∗B+¬A∗¬B: the expression of the abstract compatibility relation in context.
This obtains the representation of the input qualia as a characteristic or conventional
property which appears as an event. That event can be looked at from two different
points of view. Through the glass of the qualia which are in focus it can be represented
as an event between A and B; from the stance of the complementary context it
can be described as an event between ¬A and ¬B. The two signs represent the
interaction which is in focus, respectively, positively and negatively. Alternatively,
in the definition of (qs,C) and (qe,C) above, the complementary qualia are used to
sort out those meanings from the possible meanings of the abstract signs, qs and qe,
that may hold in context ([C]). In other words, the input is implicitly characterized
by means of complementary information of the context. State qualia occurring in
qs are represented by themselves (A(B)) and by their context (¬B(¬A));20 and,
similarly, effect qualia occurring in qe are represented by themselves (A∗B) and, by
their context (¬A∗¬B).21
(qs,C)–(qe,C)=A is B: the expression of the relation between the input qualia which are
in focus, represented as a proposition.
The logical expressions assigned to the interpretation moments are presented in fig. 7,
on the left-hand side; the corresponding Boolean relations (with the exception of the result
of the process) are displayed on the right-hand side of the same diagram. ‘0’ and ‘1’,
which are omitted, can be defined as representations of a ‘not-valid’ and a ‘valid’ input,
respectively. Note, in fig. 7, on the left-hand side, the presence of all Boolean relations on
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two variables, as meaning aspects, expressing the completeness of the cognitive process:
We look at our input from all possible angles!
This closes the first part of our ‘naive’ logical analysis. In the second part, which is to
be found in Appendix B, we introduce a procedure, generating ‘naive’ logical expressions
of sign aspects by means of relations (interactions) between neighboring signs that are in
need of settlement. In fig. 7, on the left-hand side, such expressions are connected by a
horizontal line.
4 Signs, sign aspects and interpretants
In the introduction we presented Peirce’s rules for the derivation of the long list of ceno-
scopic categories from the short list and we promised to give an exposition of the long
list later. This section contains an introduction in Peircean semiotics.
Setting off with the definition of a sign, we will introduce the sign aspects that are
discerned for each of the sign relations introduced in the introduction. Next we will make
a first step from a classification of sign aspects to a model of interpretation processes by
giving an overview of the different types of interpretant aspects Peirce distinguished.22
Finally we will show that, with some amendments to Peirce’s work, it is possible to model
interpretation processes as sign processes.
4.1 Peirce’s sign definition
We recall the sign definition given in the introduction:
A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic
relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third,
called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which
it stands itself to the same Object (CP 2.274).
In order to derive the long list we must analyze the ‘genuine triadic relation’ by which
the sign, or representamen, is capable to determine an interpretant to assume the same
relation to its object in which the sign itself stands. A triadic relation involves dyadic
relations which in turn involve monads. From the categorical underpinnings of Peircean
semiotics, it follows that lower ordered relations are involved in higher, but not the reverse.
The object and the interpretant regarded as monads, however, are not part of the triadic
sign relation. What is part of the sign relation are the dyadic relations of the sign with
object and interpretant. Involved in those relations is only one monad, the sign regarded in
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itself. Therefore, we will start the exposition of the long list with the sub-categories of the
first category which covers the relation of the sign in itself (cf. sect. 4.1.1). From there
on we will gradually work our way up through the sub-branches of the second category,
which concern, first, the relation between sign and object (cf. sect. 4.1.2) and, second,
the relation between sign and interpretant (cf. sect. 4.1.3). When we have specified
those relations the elements, or cenoscopic categories, that compose the genuine triadic
relation are given, but we still do not know how a sign (that determines an interpretant)
fulfills its duty. Starting with section 4.2 we will gradually develop a semiotic model of
the triadic sign relation.
Before we start the presentation of the long list of categories, some general remarks
about the meaning of terms used by Peirce are in order.
• The notion of a sign is inherently ambiguous. It is so because on the one hand the
term designates the representamen (potential sign) in combination with its relations
with its object and its interpretant, in short, its triadic structure, while on the other
hand it designates whatever it is that stands in place of its object, in short the
representamen only.
• The sign definition has a large scope since, according to Peirce, cognition without
signs is unthinkable and all we know we know through signs. The word sign is used
here in the broad, triadic sense of which the word representamen only designates a
small part.
• The interpretant should not be confused with an agent doing interpretation. The
interpreter is an organism, organization or system performing sign processing, the
interpretant is a next sign that represents whatever results from sign interpretation;
it can be a thought sign, a language sign or any kind of behavior.
4.1.1 The sign in itself
Before we have the possibility that something functions as a sign some demands must be
met.
(1.1) The first thing to note is that in order for something to function as a sign it must
have certain qualities. Quality is taken here in the sense of a peculiar and essential
character. Such a quality cannot be known if it is not embodied, but the embodiment
is not part of the character it has. This character, when looked at in itself, disregarding
its embodiment, is the first sign aspect recognized. It is termed the qualisign aspect.
(1.2) By recognizing that this character can only be effective through its embodied oc-
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currences, we acknowledge that the qualisign only offers the possibility for a sign and
at the same time arrive at the second sign aspect, i.e. the notion of the singular sign,
the here and now embodiment of the qualisign. This sign aspect is termed sinsign.
Existence being a notion of the second category.
(1.3) Although a qualisign can only be effective by being embodied, the singular embod-
iment is not sufficient for its being known. Therefore we must assume a convention,
a habit or a law that determines an interpreter to deal with the different singular oc-
currences of a qualisign as instances of the same type of sign. This ‘rule of identity’
is termed the legisign aspect of a sign. Since it mediates the qualisign to its sinsign
occurrences, it is the third categorical sign aspect of the first category.
Example: We may have an experience of some shape constituted by different tones of
grey. The shaped collection of qualities (qualisign aspect) occur at that moment (sinsign
aspect). If the shape is familiar, for instance because it has a pre-dominant vertical
orientation, starts at a point on earth and expands but also is more diffused the higher it
comes, we may recognize it as an instance of smoke (legisign), without, however, at this
point any word or meaning attached to it, but just as a familiar form(ation).
Sub-categories of the sign regarded in itself: Different occurrences (sinsigns 1.2) of a
similar character (qualisign 1.1) are glued together by a habit (legisign 1.3) that states
the identity of the instances.
4.1.2 The sign in relation to its object
In order to be a sign a representamen must relate to some object. Here the question is in
what principal ways a sign may present its object. The sign may present its object through
characters it has or iconically, through contiguity or indexically and, finally, through a
convention or symbolically.
(2.1) The relation is iconic if the sign may relate to any object to which it is similar in
some respect. Through this similarity, it conveys something about its objects. But,
although the iconically related sign conveys information, it does not determine any
specific object to which it professes to relate. It represents the objects that are similar
only possibly, which makes it a first category kind of relation.
(2.2) With the indexical relation between sign and object the opposite is the case, an
indexical relation excels in pointing to an object since there is an existential relation,
but such a relation does not convey any information about the object at all. Since it
is on the basis of the contiguity of sign and object that the sign represents its object,
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this is a relation belonging to the second category.
(2.3) From the above we may conclude that in order to convey information about some
specific object both an iconic and an indexical relation are needed. If a sign is
symbolically related with its object, conveying information about an object or even
just pointing towards an object depends on rules of interpretation that are attached
to the interpretant thought. Since an interpretant is needed that mediates the sign
to its object this is a third category type of relation.
Symbols can be sub-divided in two main kinds according to whether their function is
to convey information about their object (cf. the word smoke) or to point to an object
(cf. the word this). If symbols convey information typically some iconicity is involved in
the interpretation rule as when we vaguely imagine some smoke on hearing the word. If a
symbol only points to its object it has an indexical function, the indexicality, involved in
symbolic relations, can only be presented by means of icons, as when we use the image
of a pointing finger in order to explain the word this.
Examples: The smoke drawn on a painting has an iconic relation with the smoke of
any fire and, besides that, with all objects of similar shape. The smoke rising from an
actual fire has an indexical relation with that fire and can, on top of that, have an iconic
relation with all the objects that accidentally have the same shape. Smoke signals are
indexically related to the fire from which they rise, but they are symbolically related to
what is stated in the message they convey. Language of any kind is the most important
example of symbolically related signs.
Sub-categories of the relation between sign and object: An icon (2.1) is related to all
objects to which it is similar, but only possibly so. An index (2.2) actually relates to the
object it is contiguous with. A symbol (2.3) conventionally relates to its object by means
of a rule of interpretation that has to be brought to life by the interpretant.
4.1.3 The sign in relation to its interpretant
In order to realize its signhood a sign must produce an interpretant. It is important
to remark at the outset that there is a difference between the relation of the sign to
the interpretant and the interpretant of a sign. The way in which a sign relates to an
interpretant is a character of a sign. The interpretant is a new sign that at least is partially
determined by the sign that precedes it. The mode of determination of the interpretant
sign is what is covered by ‘the relation of the sign to its interpretant’. The mode of
determination can be only suggestive, just constative and, to some degree, coercive.
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(3.1) The relation between sign and interpretant is suggestive or rhematic, if the sign
merely raises an idea.
(3.2) The relation is constative or propositional, if the sign expresses a fact with which
an interpreter can agree or disagree.
(3.3) The relation is coercive to some degree or argumentative, if the sign actually con-
vinces by reason.
Note that the difference between a rhematic, a propositional and an argumentative
relation has nothing to do with the composition of the representamen. As a matter
of fact a term, a prototypical case of a rhematic address of the interpretant, has an
argumentative relation with the interpretant, when part of the argument is transferred to
the rule of interpretation involved in the symbol or when the context provides additional
information. For instance, ‘Halt!’ being shouted by a warden in a jail, has argumantative
force for the prisoner addressed. Just so, an argument can have a rhematic relation with
its object, most typical in those cases that the argument is irrelevant for the interpreter
that generates an interpretant of the argument. This line of thought brings us to the
categorical background of the distinctions introduced. A rhematic relation between sign
and interpretant exists if the sign leaves its object and its interpretant what it may be. It
is for the interpretant a mere possible, which makes it a first category type of relation. A
propositional relation between sign and interpretant exists if the sign distinctly indicates
its object, but leaves its interpretant what it may be, which makes it a second category
type of relation. An argumentative relation between sign and interpretant, finally, is a
relation that distinctly indicates its object and the conclusion or interpretant, which it
intends to determine (cf. CP 2.95). This makes it a relation of the third type of category.
Examples: When visiting a museum the smoke pictured on one of the paintings nor-
mally has a rhematic relation with the interpretant thought. It raises an idea and that’s
it. When two scouts of a raiding party ride through the country and the one says to the
other ‘I see smoke signals’, the relation between the sign pointed at and the interpretant
generated by the second man is propositional. The implied question being ‘Do you agree
with the fact I observed?’ When you sit in your room and smoke is coming in from
underneath the door and through the cracks between the planks of a wooden floor, the
relation between sign (smoke coming in) and interpretant (looking for an escape)23 is,
although the major premiss is suppressed, argumentative.
Sub-categories of the relation between sign and interpretant: The relation between
sign and interpretant is rhematic (3.1) if the sign only raises an idea. The relation
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Object (O)Sign (S)
1.2 sinsign
Interpretant (I)
1.1 qualisign
1.3 legisign
3.3 argumentative
3.2 propositional
3.1 rhematic
3 relation to I
1 relation to S
2 relation to O
2.1 iconic
2.2 indexical
2.3 symbolic
Figure 8: Sign model completed with sign aspects
is propositional (3.2) if the sign professes to state a fact. The relation is argumentative
(3.3) if the sign convinces by providing reasons to accept the interpretant sign it suggests.
4.2 Towards a theory of interpretation
When we accept that lower ordered (sub) categories are involved in higher ordered (sub)
categories and also accept that the only sign that brings forth an interpretant on its own
account, is a sign that is argumentatively related to its interpretant, we also must accept
that in such a sign type all sign aspects are involved. This opens up interesting possibilities
that can best be illustrated by a comparison with Kant’s use of his categories.
In fig. 8 the long list of categories is organized in a way that shares a characteristic
with Kant’s scheme. As it is possible with Kant’s schema to classify all propositions
by indicating the sub-categorical value for each of the categories, at least in theory, it
is possible with Peirce’s scheme to classify all signs in types by giving its highest sub-
categorical value on each of the categorical relations. In both cases the labels for the
categories are class names.
The rule that higher (sub) categories involve the lower, but not the reverse, however,
opens up a possibility not present in Kant. In fig. 9 all sign aspects are given. Since
in an argument sign all aspects are involved in an ordered way, here we have a first
approximation of what is needed for a description of the process of interpretation that
leads to a response. For a better approximation of this process it is necessary to analyze
the way in which a sign generates an interpretant, that in its turn may function as a sign.
Since the interpretant, once developed, is a sign itself all sign aspects must be present.
In the process of generating a new sign, which possibly includes transformation and
enrichment, the sign aspects appear as moments in the process of interpretation. This
ideally implies that through interpretation increasingly better approximations of the import
of the sign are realized. In this process, information pertaining to the sign is explicated
in each interpretation moment, for otherwise subsequent interpretation moments would
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Figure 9: Peirce’s classification of signs. As the sign aspects can be hypostatized as moments
in a process of interpretation their adjectival expression can be replaced by a nominal form,
for example, ‘iconic’ can be replaced by the term ‘icon’. Note however that by doing this an
ambiguity is introduced since the term icon is often used as a shorthand for a sign type, for
instance when we use the term icon to indicate a rhematic, iconic legisign.
not be more than a mere re-generation of already existing states. As this growth of
information involves a contribution by the interpreting system itself and assuming there
is a single sign offering itself for interpretation, we need a shift of view and must consider
the sign (S) to be an effect, affecting the interpreting system occurring in a state. As
the interpretation, representing the system’s reaction on the input steadily develops, it
can occasion the ‘generation’ of further interpretation moments that themselves may be
regarded as signs. Such a process is schematically illustrated in fig. 10.
In order to keep a clear distinction between the sign and the interpretant perspective
we term these interpretation moments interpretant aspects, or simply, following Peirce,
interpretants. By prefixing the term interpretant with an adjective we are able to dis-
tinguish the different characteristic contributions to the development of the import of a
sign.
kI
kσ
S O
I=<I , ..., I  >1 k
σ=<σ , ..., σ  >k1 σ OS
I
O
σ1
21I  /S
S/S1
k−1 kI     /S
Figure 10: Interpretation depicted as a series of events (left) and a single event (middle),
paraphrased as an instance of the processing schema (right). Ij , Sj , σj for 1≤j≤k (1≤k) stand
for interpretants, signs, and states, respectively; O is the shared, common object of S1,S2,. . .,Sk.
The symbol “/” expresses the possibility of a change of view from result of a former to start of
a subsequent interpretation process. This enables Ij to be looked at from two perspectives as
the interpretant generated in σj and, as a representation of the next state, as a potential sign.
Angle parentheses are used for a series interpreted as a single entity.
The individual interpretation events change the state of the interpreting system. In
fig. 10, this is indicated by the sequence of states σ=<σ1,. . .,σk>, for 1≤k. We use the
convention that in state σj (1≤j≤k), the interpreting system is involved in the generation
of Ij, the interpretant of Sj. O designates the shared, common object of Sj for 1≤j≤k.
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Figure 11: The Peircean sign aspects (left) and the identified interpretant aspects (right)
projected on it (the three new interpretant aspects are given in boldface). The DIR represents
the current approximation of the normal interpretant).
The triadic relation, (Sj,O,Ij), or the next state of the interpreting system functions
as a potential sign in a subsequent interpretation event. For instance, σ2=(S1,O,I1) is
interpreted as S2. Note that k may stand for any natural number, as the set of states
define a non-strictly monotonous ordering of increasingly better approximations of the
meaning of S for a given interpreter.24
On the basis of this model, nine classes of interpretants can be defined, in conformity
with the nine classes of sign aspects. Among these nine interpretants, six are due to
Peirce himself, and three to the first author who derived them from the assumption that,
given the fact that according to the sign definition an interpretant becomes a sign itself,
it is sensible to assume that all nine sign aspects discerned have to reappear in the process
of interpretation (Breemen & Sarbo, 2007). The coordination of sign aspects with the
different interpretants proved only possible after the introduction of the assumption that
interpretation must involve an interaction between an observer (interpreting system) and
a sign (representamen) (Farkas & Sarbo, 2000).
4.3 Peirce’s theory of interpretants
In this section we present Peirce’s interpretant aspects and we will match them with
the sign aspects. For three sign aspects there are no corresponding interpretant aspects.
For those sign aspects we will introduce corresponding interpretants. After that we will
illustrate the complete set of interpretants with an example.
Peirce identifies “the first proper significate effect of a sign,” with the term emotional
interpretant (cf. CP. 5.475). It designates the moment in semiosis in which a sign intrudes
our mind as a series of impressions in their unanalyzed form. This series of qualities give
rise to a feeling of complexity that needs to be resolved (cf. CP 1.554). Note the
correspondence between the unanalyzed impressions and the concept of a qualisign as a
mere possible. See also fig. 11.
In CP 5.475 Peirce continues: “If a sign produces any further proper significate effect,
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it will do so through the mediation of the emotional interpretant, and such further effect
will always involve an effort. I call it the energetic interpretant.” Peirce made a dis-
tinction between two kinds of energetic interpretants, a physical and a mental energetic
interpretant.25 The physical interpretant indicates that the series of feelings has a here
and now existence. Without it the impressions can at most appear as background noise
without leaving a trace and no further significate effect could be produced. Note the
correspondence of the energetic physical interpretant with the concept sinsign.
The mental energetic interpretant designates the moment in semiosis in which the
series of impressions appears as a one time (single act) ordered collection of qualisigns, a
form. Note the correspondence with the concept icon. Also note that the two energetic
interpretants will simultaneously arise out of the emotional interpretant. But they are
independent in the sense that the interpretant sign to be developed may either focus on
the significance of the existence of the input (that a sign is inscribed) or on the significance
of the form (what the sign conveys).
In the complexus of the mental and physical energetic interpretant the immediate
interpretant is potentially present. It is the: “[...] interpretant represented explicitly or
implicitly in the sign itself” (MS339, 276r, April 2, 1906).26 Looked at from the typical
Peircean, general standpoint it is not what a given interpreter at a particular time takes
that meaning to be, but it is the meaning in general that any interpreter in the right
understanding of the sign would develop. Looked at from a more individual perspective
it indicates all interpretational possibilities of a given interpreting system. The immediate
interpretant is related to the meaning of the sign in a given case as the dictionary meaning
of a term is related to the same term in actual use. Note the correspondence with the
concept rheme.
The field of possible meanings of the sign must be ‘narrowed down’ to one specific
interpretation in order to enable the interpretive system to generate a response. “The
actual effect produced on a given interpreter on a given occasion in a given stage of
his consideration of a sign” (MS 339, 288r, October 23, 1908) is labeled by Peirce with
the term dynamical interpretant. Note the correspondence of the dynamical interpretant
with the concept dicent (proposition). Also note that the dynamical interpretant can be
defined as a sign that specifies the meaning of the immediate interpretant for a specific
context (possible explanation).
At another place Peirce illustrated the concept of a dynamic interpretant differently:
For instance, suppose I awake in the morning before my wife, and that after-
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wards she wakes up and inquires, “What sort of a day is it?” [. . .] This is a sign,
whose Object, as expressed, is the weather at that time, but whose Dynamical
Object is the impression which I have presumably derived from peeping between
the window-curtains. Whose interpretant, as expressed, is the quality of the
weather, but whose Dynamical Interpretant, is my answering her question (CP
8.314).
Here the dynamic interpretant is a responding sign, not an interpretant aspect. This
is acknowledged in this paper by calling it the Dynamical Interpretant Response (DIR).
The DIR is a term that designates a new sign arising from a specific clash between a
sign and a given interpreter or, alternatively it designates the sign that results from the
aforementioned process.
Finally, Peirce indicated a normal interpretant, designating the movement of thought,
expressible as an argument, in which the sign together with habits inscribed in the receptive
mind, as premises, generate a conclusion.27
The commanded act in the mere doing of it as influenced by the command
is the dynamical interpretant (DIR; the authors). But insofar as that conduct
involves the recognition of the command and is obedient to it and recognizes
this correctly, it is the representative (the more usual Peircean term is ‘normal’;
the authors) interpretant. (MS 339, 253r, October 9, 1905)
Note the similarity with the concept argument. The tendency of the normal inter-
pretant to generate ‘satisfactory’ responses in the long run can only be accounted for if
we suppose a sequence of arguments aiming at a final interpretant. In this case each
argument as a whole is taken as a sign itself and confronted with higher level habits until
a response pattern is reached that does not yield falsifying consequences.
Peirce did not define interpretants for each of the sign aspects. Interpretant coun-
terparts are missing for the indexical, the legisign, and the symbolic aspects. For the
index this is not surprising since the original, pure indexical relation of contiguity that
exists between sign and object (cf. an instance of smoke indicating a fire) cannot, qua
indexical relation, be present in an interpretant without losing its indexicality. It has to
be represented in the interpreting system by other, symbolic means. This does not mean,
however, that indexicality does not play a role in the domain of interpretant aspects.
Before it is possible to represent the instance of smoke as indicating fire, the symbolic,
convential meaning of the form has to be recognized by the interpreting system as an
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(3) complementation
(4) predication
(2) abstraction
(1) sorting
smoke−as−sensations
Run!
a−certain−form
fire−above−
the−roof
a−sign−of−danger be−alert
danger−etc.
an−appearing−event
smoke−a−possible−for−
this−smoke−is−
formation
Figure 12: Interpretants of a visual observation of smoke as a sign of danger
instance of a type (legisign). The construction of the legisign and the symbolic meaning
aspects of a sign demand a contribution of the interpreting system. This is only possible
if the perceived energetic mental interpretant (icon) is connected (indexicality), in the
receptive brain/mind, with the legisign and, mediated by the legisign, with the symbol.
In the next section we show that the missing interpretants can be identified if we assume
a contribution of the interpreting system.
4.3.1 From sign interpretation to sign processes
A sign only functions as a sign if it is involved in an interpretive process and generates
interpretants. From this we conclude that a semiotic model of interpretative processes
must account for the fact that such a process sets of at the moment a sign gets inscribed
in an interpreting system, which is capable of generating DIR’s. The interpreting system
must also be a sign, otherwise it could not grow in information. In his semiotic writings
Peirce acknowledges this when he writes that man is a sign, but he did not systematically
draw out the consequences of this thought. In his logical system, the existential graphs, a
system of logic equivalent to Frege’s Begriffschrift, however, Pierce introduced the Sheet
of Assertion:
It is agreed that a certain sheet, or blackboard, shall, under the name of The
Sheet of Assertion, be considered as representing the universe of discourse,
and as asserting whatever is taken for granted between the graphist and the
interpreter to be true of that universe. The sheet of assertion is, therefore, a
graph (CP 4.396, 1903).
This sheet is enriched by inscribing graphs in it, just as an interpreting system grows
when it acquires new information. We transpose this idea to the domain of semiotics
with the introduction of the Semiotic Sheet (Ss). This sheet, as it is itself a sign too,
has, as all signs have, three modalities: the Possible (P), the Actual (A) and the Lawful
or Habitual (L). In its P-modality the sheet is conceived to contain whatever is inscribed
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and potentially can be used if a sign offers itself for interpretation. In its A-modality it
is conceived to be in the state it is in at the moment a sign inscribes itself (this has a
sinsign as well as an icon aspect).28 In its L-modality it contains the habitually inscribed
goals29 that govern the production of a DIR on the occasion of a sign offering itself.
In order to give an impression of how the sign interpretation process works according
to the model we provide a sketchy example (see also fig. 12). The interpretation events
are indicated by (1)-(4). Let us assume that what knocks at the door of consciousness
is ‘smoke’, appearing as a visual sign. It enters the Ss as a series of impressions (emo-
tional interpretant; qualisign). Only if spontaneous, habitual interpretation fails, the input
triggers a feeling that urges further interpretation.30
(1) The impressions get sorted out as a form (mental energetic interpretant; icon) and
settle as a singularity (physical energetic interpretant; sinsign).
(2) Since it is a familiar iconic singularity the form is recognized as an instance of
smoke formation (rule; legisign). Since it is a singular icon out of any context at
this moment, all kinds of interpretations become possible such as smoke as a sign of
danger, comfort, and so on (immediate interpretant; rheme).
(3) Assuming the smoke formation occurs in a specific context (there is smoke above a
roof on fire) a conventional meaning of the legisign is developed (convention; symbol).
But, of course, in a different context, the smoke formation could mean that one
may expect comfort, if one is lost in a forest for instance. Those possibilities are
contained in the rheme. If, later on, the strong convention proves wrong, a new run
of the process may delve up those possibilities. Doubt is time consuming after all.
Through the connection with what is contained in the Ss about the present situation
(smoke is rising above a roof on fire), the conventional meaning gets embedded in an
understanding of the situation at hand (this smoke above the roof is a sign of danger)
(dynamical interpretant; dicent).
(4) This dynamical interpretant is, again through a connection with what is contained
in Ss, placed under a rule of habit that covers this kind of case and a response (DIR)
is generated (if there is danger, then run as fast as possible; this smoke above the
roof is signifying danger; therefore we should run away as fast as possible) (normal
interpretant; argument). Since experience with the effect of different types of re-
sponse will be fed back in the mechanism, successful responses tend to strengthen
interpretation habits (final interpretant).
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But also note that if the Ss is in the state of expecting a sign, a ‘top down’ response
speeds up the process considerably by action on expectation; the child in the candy store
says in that particular voice “Mom,. . .” and gets “No!” as an answer before being able
to finish.
If sign interpretation consists in a sequence of interpretants generated by a process
then the (full) meaning of a sign must contain the meaning of all of its less developed
approximations. This line of thinking brought us to a model of interpretation, which is
isomorphic and analogous to the model of cognitive activity introduced in sect. 2.1.
5 Isomorphic models of informative processes
The Peircean interpretants also can be pinpointed in the interpretation process of smoke.
Let us assume that at the moment the visual sign of an agressively rising smoke (S) is
inscribed in the semiotic sheet of the observer (Ss), the observer possesses contextual
information about earlier observations of smoke phenomena and corresponding response
strategies. It is by virtue of that knowledge that the observer is capable of representing
the appearing rising smoke (sign), in relation to the interpreting system (which too is a
sign), as a combinatory potential. For example, if in earlier observations we experienced
smoke and rising (of smoke) to co-occur, we may represent this fact as a potential of
these signs to combine with each other. Such a combination of signs is what we call a
sign interaction.
The interpretation of smoke as a sign of danger may proceed as follows. The qualia
of smoke (observer’s state) and rising (input effect), as well as the observer’s background
knowledge about the present situation appear as a ‘primordial soup’ ([qs qe C]), repre-
senting the input as impressions.
(1) The qualia of the observer’s state in the ‘primordial soup’ are represented as a one
time ordered collection, which is a sign ([qs]). Also the qualia of the input effect are
represented as a sign. As the appearance of an effect always entails the existence of a
state (but not the other way around), the qualia of rising (of smoke) are represented
as a singular event that occurs now ([qe]). Finally, also the observer’s background
knowledge is represented by a pointer to a collection of interrelated state and effect
qualia ([C]) or the context in which the interaction between the qualia of rising and
the qualia of smoke as imprinted in the interpreting system (Ss) takes place.
(2) The qualia of the rising, independent from the actual state of the Ss is represented
as a rule-like compatibility relation (qe), expressing the habitual knowledge pertaining
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to the current occurrence of rising smoke. The collection of qualia of the observer’s
state, independent from the qualia of rising is represented as a range of possible
interpretations, capable of being combined with any appearing smoke related property
or effect (qs).
(3) This is followed by a representation of the observer’s state in context ((qs,C)),
narrowing down the range of possible interpretations of qs to an actually existent
one. Also the habitual knowledge about rising (of smoke) is represented in context,
expressing the conventional interpretation of the input effect ((qe,C)).
(4) Finally, the rising (of smoke), combined with the actual state of the Ss is represented
as a sign of danger, (qs,C)–(qe,C), on the basis of the observer’s knowledge about
smoke phenomena ([C]), which is only implied.
The isomorphism between the process model of cognitive activity (see sect. 2.1) and
the Peircean hierarchy of sign aspects enables the cognitive model to be interpreted as a
meaning generating process. More specifically, the events of the model can be associated
with Peircean sign aspects this time interpreted as proto-signs31 that are becoming signs
(Sarbo, 2006). In turn, the above isomorphic relation enables the Peircean sign hierarchy
to be interpreted as a process, representing interactions between qualities (phenomena) by
means of interactions between proto-signs. Below we will use the Peircean sign aspects as
references to interpretation moments or positions of the processing schema, for instance,
qualisign as a reference to [qs qe C].
In the interpretation process, the input interaction is represented by collections of
qualia in the qualisign position ([qs qe C]). The interaction between those collections
or, the interaction within the ‘primordial soup’ is represented in the icon ([qs]), sinsign
([qe]) and index sign positions ([C]). As [qs] and [qe] too are independent, they can
interact. Their interaction is represented in the rheme (qs) and legisign (qe) positions. In
qs, the relations included in [qs] (icon) and [qe] (sinsign) are represented dominantly and
suppressed, respectively. This is opposed to qe, in which the relation included in the sinsign
position is represented dominantly and the one included in the icon suppressed. This
dependency between qs (rheme) and qe (legisign) is revealed by their logical expressions:
qs=A∗¬B,¬A∗B, qe=A∗¬B+¬A∗B (cf. fig. 7). As qs (rheme) and qe (legisign) are
not independent, the interpretation process cannot proceed without additional signs. It is
at this point where the importance of the index position ([C]) becomes clear. By virtue
of the independence of [C] from qs as well as from qe, the interpretation moments (qs,C),
(qe,C) and, finally, (qs,C)–(qe,C), can be generated.
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Figure 13: A schematic view of the interpretation of complex phenomena. For 1≤i≤n (1≤n),
Si are input signs, O their shared common object, σi are states of the Ss. In σi, the interpretant
of the change due to Si is represented by Ii. For 1≤i≤n, the triadic relations (Si,O,Ii), depicted
by a triangle, represent an instance of the interpretation process as shown in fig. 10. Angle
parentheses are used for a series interpreted as a single entity.
We may talk about a sign realizing its purpose only if the argumentative sign aspect is
realized. For only a proto-sign in the argument position is capable of generating a reaction.
This implies that all less developed interpretant aspects or sign aspects must be involved
(cf. fig. 9). It is in this sense that the cognitive process is generating increasingly better
approximations of the import of the input sign. In this process, all events are modeled as
interactions between dual proto-signs (sign aspects), interpreted as states and effects.
5.1 Modeling complex phenomena
We call a phenomenon complex if its interpretation involves the processing of nested and
more simple phenomena. As the processing of those nested phenomena is necessary for
the interpretation of the complex phenomenon, the nested phenomena can be modeled as
signs having a shared, common object (O). Examples of complex phenomena are images
in commercial design and sentences in natural language processing. Words occurring in
a sentence stand for the sentence (O) and signify it from a certain point of view. The
similarity between fig. 10 and fig. 13 shows that the processing of simple and complex
signs can be identically modeled. This expresses that the model is scalable.
Let us assume that the interpreting system (Ss) is involved in the processing of a
complex sign S:=<S1,. . . ,Sn> (see also fig. 13). In conformity with the process view
of sign interpretation, in state σi (1≤i≤n), the Ss is involved in the generation of the
interpretant, Ii, representing the change due to Si, as well as the generation of the next
state, (Si,O,Ii). The processing of S can be modeled by means of a series of interpretation
processes, representing the change due to subsequent input signs, Si, by proto-signs in
the interpretation of the entire series, S. As a consequence of nesting σi contains all
earlier interpretants, Ij (1≤j≤i). As each σi can be represented as an instance of the
processing schema, each state can be defined by a series of interpretation moments,
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as shown in fig. 10. In contrast to the limited number of different sign aspects and
interpretation moments, a complex phenomenon may consist of any number of nested
signs. How interpretation of complex phenomena can be modeled with a single instance
of the processing schema is the subject of the next section on language processing.
5.2 Language sign processing
In past research (Sarbo, Farkas, & Breemen, 2006) we have shown that natural language
processing can be modeled by a sequential version of the processing schema. For a
sequence of input signs, S=<S1,. . .,Sn>, each state σi (1≤i≤n) can be represented by a
collection of proto-signs. In the processing of a single input sign, the previous and current
percepts can be defined by the collection of proto-signs included in the actual state of the
Ss (σi), and the collection of qualia introduced by the next input sign (Si), respectively. As
the current and previous percepts are different, if only by virtue of their different temporal
properties, the condition for an interaction is satisfied. Because the proto-signs included
in σi are uniquely marked by their sign aspect, the next state can be defined as a change
of σi brought about by the interaction with Si interpreted as a qualisign. This requires Si
to be treated as a combinatory potential with respect to the sign aspects or positions of
the processing schema, i.e. it asks specifying in which positions Si can establish a relation
with another sign. Below we assume that less developed interpretations are generated
before the more developed one (economic representation). Although in theory the term
proto-sign is associated with the interpretation moments introduced in our process model,
in order to make a distinction between signs to be interpreted and signs that comprise
the process of interpretation, below, because it is a relative distinction, for the sake of
simplicity we omit the prefix. Having said this, we define our model of language processing,
as follows.
For the sake of convenience we suppose the qualisign position on the Ss to be empty at
the moment the first input sign offers itself for interpretation. This enables us to represent
the appearing first sign in the qualisign position. The interaction between the subsequent
input sign and the already existing representation in the qualisign position forces the latter
to be represented by a more developed proto-sign,32 which can be a sign in the icon ([qs])
or the sinsign positions ([qe]). Such a sign interaction between an existing sign and an
appearing new sign triggering a representation of the already existing sign by a more
developed one33 is called a coercion. See fig. 14(a), for the icon position. As [qs] and [qe]
are representations of the (same) ‘primordial soup’, but the input signs are in principle
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Figure 14: Sample coercion sign interactions. A ‘•’ indicates an already existing sign, a ‘◦’
an appearing new one; a ‘→’ designates a state transition of the Ss; dashed arrows are used for
indicating traces of sign interpretation.
independent from each other, in sequential sign processing the icon and sinsign positions
cannot be simultaneously realized in any state of the Ss. This means that the generation
of signs in the icon and sinsign positions will trigger further interpretation events (cf.
sect. 4.3). If there is a sign in the icon or sinsign position, it will become represented by a
sign in the rheme (qs), index ([C]) or legisign position (qe). See fig. 14(b), for the rheme
position.
In sequential sign processing, we may not know in advance if an appearing input sign
conveys information in focus or complementary with respect to the entire input or the
sentence. In our model we assume that, initially, each input sign is representing informa-
tion which is in focus and only if this hypothesis fails34 we assume it to be complementary
and represent it, for instance, by a sign in the index position. Since a validation of the
above hypothesis necessary involves the representation of an input sign either in the icon
or the sinsign positions, a representation of the input in the index position trivially can
be generated by means of coercion. See fig. 14(c).
The generation of a sign in the rheme or legisign position may trigger further sign inter-
actions. Besides a coercion, a sign interaction can be either a binding or an accumulation.
In a binding, the sign representing the interaction has a higher position in the processing
schema, than the position of the interacting signs themselves (constituents). This is op-
posed to accumulation, in which the position of the representation of the sign interaction
and the positions of the interacting signs are identical. For example, the binding of signs
in the rheme and index positions can be represented by a sign in the dicent position; the
accumulation of signs in the rheme position can be represented by a more complex rheme
sign. In our model we allow sign interactions to be represented degenerately, meaning
that the position of the representation of a sign interaction is equivalent to the position
of one of the constituents. Looking at accumulation and coercion from this perspective,
these two operations can be considered to be degenerate versions of a binding (note that
coercion and accumulation satisfy the condition for a non-strictly monotonic representa-
tion of increasingly better approximations of the final sentence sign). The importance of
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(e)verb
(s)noun
(e)adj,adv,
prep−compl
(e)adj,adv,verb,
(e)prep(−compl)(s)noun
prep(−compl)
(s,e)verb
(s)noun
(s)noun
(s,e)word
(s,e)sentence
Figure 15: A classification of the syntactic signs used, on the basis of the relational properties
of the types of word classes. The status of a sign in a syntactic sign interaction, which can be
state of effect, is designated by (s) and (e), respectively.
degenerate representation is due to its potential for enabling positions of the processing
schema to be re-used, thereby allowing a processing of sentences of arbitrary length.
In language processing, input signs are interpreted from the perspective of their con-
tribution to the entire input, which is the sentence. In our model of syntactic language
processing, the combinatory potential of input signs, which are symbols, is defined on the
basis of their language types. Nouns are represented as state-type symbols (s); adjectives,
adverbs, verbs, etc. as effect-type symbols (e). The combinatory potential of types of
language symbols in different positions of the processing schema is depicted in fig. 15.
For example, in syntactic language processing, a verb in the legisign position (e.g. run)
has the potential for interaction with an adverb in the index position (e.g. fast). Pending
sign interactions are forced to be realized by means of sentence closing dot symbols. In
our model we assume that the input is closed by a constant number of dot symbols. An
illustration of the above model of language processing is given in the next section. In the
examples, the combinatory potential of symbols is assumed, but not defined. Examples
illustrating that level of detail may be found in (Farkas, 2008), in which also questions
concerning the definition of a syntactic lexicon are discussed. A formal definition, includ-
ing a proof of the linear complexity of our model of syntactic language processing may
be found in (Sarbo & Farkas, 2002).
5.2.1 Examples
Our first example is the syntactic analysis of an utmost simple sentence: ‘John likes Mary’ (in
short ‘J l M’). See also fig. 16. In this and later diagrams, the states of the Ss are referred
to by subsequent letters of the alphabet given in parentheses. In (a), the appearing
first symbol, J (state-type), is interpreted as a qualisign. As the input symbols are in
principle independent and partake in the syntactic phenomenon expressed by the entire
sentence, the appearing next symbol, l (effect-type), forces the parser to reconsider the
earlier interpretation of J (qualisign) and represent it via coercion, in (b), as a constituent
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Figure 16: A failing syntactic analysis of ‘John likes Mary’. As, in (f), a final representation,
J (argument position) is already available but it does not represent the entire input, parsing
fails. Conceptually, each state (except the first state) contains the interpretations included in
the previous state, as traces. For instance, (b) includes the trace of J as a qualisign, introduced
in (a). In the diagrams such traces are omitted.
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Figure 17: A successful syntactic analysis of ‘John likes Mary’, after backtracking to stage (e),
in fig. 16
(icon) of the entire input.
In (c), the appearance of M (state-type) has similar consequences on the interpretation
of l (qualisign) and, transitively so, on the interpretation of J (icon). The latter is a
consequence of an earlier assumption that signs in the icon and sinsign positions are
incompatible for a binding, except in a ‘negative’ sense through their relative difference,
via coercion (cf. abstraction). For this reason, J has to be represented again, this
time as an abstract term or a possible for the subject of the sentence (rheme). The
subsequently appearing dot symbol, in (d), triggers the representation of M (icon) by a
more developed sign. By following the same strategy as in the case of J, parsing eventually
will fail, as it will not be possible to represent the entire input by a single (sentence) sign.
The failure will make the parser backtrack35 until the first choice-point providing another
alternative.36 Such a choice-point is available in (d), in which M (icon) can be represented
as a complementary sign (index). This is illustrated in fig. 17(e’). A representation of M
by a sign in the index position is possible due to the existence of l (legisign), anticipating
M as a complement.
The analysis of another example, ‘Mary eats pizza with a fork’ (in short ‘M e p waf’), is
depicted in fig. 18 and fig. 19. We assume the existence of a morpho-syntactical parsing:
(Mary)(eats) (pizza)(with a fork).37 The combination of a semiotic, syntactic and ‘naive’ logical
interpretation of the input symbols reveals that, in fig. 18, Mary (A) can be interpreted as a
possible for the subject (rheme; A∗¬B), and eats (B) as the rule-like meaning underlying
the predicate of the sentence (legisign; A∗¬B+¬A∗B). The two signs are interrelated by
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Figure 18: A syntactic analysis of ‘Mary eats pizza with a fork’ (alternative #1) yielding Mary
eats-pizza with-a-fork (a representation of the final predication symbol interactions is omitted)
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Figure 19: A syntactic analysis of ‘Mary eats pizza with a fork’ (alternative #2) yielding Mary
eats pizza-with-a-fork (the missing parsing events, stages (a)-(d), are identical to those presented
in fig. 18)
the complementary state pizza and, in a later interpretation moment, by the complementary
effect with-a-fork (index; ¬A+¬B). This is opposed to the interpretation depicted in fig. 19,
in which pizza (A) is temporarily considered to be a candidate for the subject (rheme),
preceding its interaction with with-a-fork (B). This forces the interpretation of pizza to be
reconsidered, this time as a complementary sign, in order to represent pizza-with-a-fork as a
complementary expression of the context (index; ¬A∗¬B).
6 Conclusion and further research
Past experience with traditional, static knowledge representation (KR) revealed its limi-
tations in current information processing characterized by complex, interrelated data. In
this paper we suggest that the growing complexity of KR can be more adequately coped
with if we respect the dynamic nature of the input data. To this end we developed a
model for knowledge representation on the basis of a Peircean theory of signs. As Peirce’s
theory cannot be directly interpreted as a KR, let alone a computational one, we took a
step back and, first, introduced a process model of cognitive activity. By analyzing this
model from a ‘naive’ logical point of view we were able to assign a logical expression
and, eventually, a Peircean sign aspect, to the interpretation moments of the process. As
a result, we could define a representation that satisfies the conditions set by cognitive
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activity on the one hand, and complies with Peirce’s semiotic theory on the other.
An advantage of a cognitive and semiotic foundation of our approach is due to its
potential for a uniform representation of knowledge. Although this hypothesis formally
cannot be proved, for knowledge is not some ‘thing’ that can be captured in (formal)
rules, it can be tested, by applying the theory in different domains, as we did in past
research. An attractive feature of uniform representation is its potential for merging
knowledge from different domains in a single representation, by means of structural co-
ordination, which must be more efficient than the use of translations between different
representations. Some evidence supporting this assumption is found in (Hagoort, Hald,
Bastiaansen, & Petersson, 2004), experimentally justifying that information processing
in the syntactic and semantic domains can be quasi-simultaneous. An interesting conse-
quence of a uniform representation is its scalability ; low- and high-level knowledge, but
also conceptualization by a single actor or, by different stake-holders can be modeled in
the same fashion.
An advantage of the processual interpretation of the proposed KR method is that it
gives insight in the events of informative processes, thereby enabling a systematic lexi-
cal definition of data. By using the dependencies between the events in our model, the
efficiency of conceptualization processes can be improved. For instance, in problem elicita-
tion, we are able to raise more pointed questions and, because the meta-level information
(sign aspects) provides handles to fill in the gaps in the knowledge of the object domain,
elicitation becomes more economic. Stake-holders’ time can be expensive, after all.
In this paper, our focus is on knowledge modeling in the ‘naive’ logical, and syntac-
tic domains of symbols. In past research we tested our theory for modeling information
processing in the morpho-syntactic, semantic syntactic, ‘naive’ mathematical and reason-
ing domains (Sarbo & Farkas, 2002), (Sarbo & Farkas, 2003), (Farkas & Sarbo, 2004),
(Sarbo et al., 2006). The theoretical possibilities of our knowledge representation have
been illustrated with an extended example in text summarization (Sarbo & Farkas, 2004).
Scalability has been subject of theoretical and experimental research in problem elicita-
tion, by individuals38 (Couwenberg, 2007) as well as organizations (Breemen, Sarbo, &
Weide, 2007), (Klomp, 2008).39 The results comply with our conjectures, including the
aspect of scalability.
In current research, our first priority is the definition of an extended version of our
theory, capable of combining ‘bottom-up’ input processing with ‘top-down’ anticipatory
interpretation. The development of such a model is necessary for an application of the
theory to practical problems in information processing.
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Note that it is not the implementation of the process model (processing schema),
but the definition of the combinatory properties of qualia that can be most laborious. In
traditional KR, the relation between parser and lexicon is usually the reverse. The potential
of Peirce’s categories to be recursively applied to themselves enables lexical definitions to
be systematically defined. Finally we remark that the machine of the ‘ghost’ proposed
raises interesting venues for brain research. This minimally requires a mapping of the
interpretation moments to units in the brain that realize the informational functions.40
Notes
1For a thoughtful attempt to structure this history from an art historical perspective
see (Elkins, 1999).
2 For an account of this history see (Kra¨mer, 1988). For a source history of its
formalization see (Heijenoort, 1967).
3Cf. (Cocchiarella, 2001) for a discussion of logic as language (primacy of the pred-
icative function) vs logic as calculus (primacy of set theory) in questions of ontology.
4The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Edinburgh, 1843, viii, 83, footnote (cited in (Peirce,
1931-58), vol. 1, para. 241, footnote 1, p.110).
5We thank Y. Senden for his advice on ancient Greek.
6A reference to (Peirce, 1931-58) is given by volume and paragraph, separated by a
point.
7With regard to Peirce’s intellectual development a multitude of opinions can be found
in the secondary literature. For an overview see Appendix A.
8“It seems to me that one of the first useful steps toward a science of semeiotic
(se´meio¨tike´), or the cenoscopic science of signs, must be the accurate definition, or
logical analysis, of the concepts of the science” (CP 8.343).
9See www.cs.ru.nl/kif.
10Vague is to be preferred over general here for two reasons. First, because the qualia
in question are less vivid, for instance, than the qualia that are filled in by the mind
in the blind spot (cf. (Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1997)). Second, because the words
‘more general’ point in the direction of a loss of comprehension and a growth in extension.
While here we are concerned with: “The vague memory of a sensation is just an aggregate,
whether continuous or not makes no difference, of ideas which are called up together by
a suggesting idea” (CP 7.407).
11Peirce made a classification of sign types, different classifications of sign aspects and
a lot of scattered remarks point in the direction of a processual line of thinking, but he
did not make a model for the interpretational process.
12‘Systematic’ is used here in contrast with historical.
13In cognitive theory, the potential for treating a collection of qualities as a single entity
is known as ‘chunking’.
14The terms quality and quale designate, so to speak, the outside and inside perspective
on an entity, from the point of view of the interpreting system; qualia is plural for quale.
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15During input processing the stimulus may change, meaning that its previous and
current value can be different. That difference can be interpreted by the brain, as a
change, mediating the current value of the stimulus to its supposed meaning.
16Alternatively, cognition could be called conception.
17We call the interpretation moments generated by the processing schema representa-
tions (of the input qualia).
18The term context is used ambiguously, in its potential ([qs qe C]) and its actual
contribution ([C]) to information processing.
19As A and ¬A (but also B and ¬B) arise due to the same input trigger, the two
collections are not independent.
20 As the two types of input qualia are commonly interpreted as variables, a reference
to the state qualia contains a reference to the effect qualia as well. ¬B and ¬A are
contributed by the context ([C]).
21 The occurrence of an effect entails the existence of a state. This simultaneity
included in B(¬B) is represented by A∗B(¬A∗¬B).
22For some words on the interpretation of Peirce’s explorative work on the different
kinds of interpretants see Appendix A.
23Note that in a detailed analysis ‘looking for an escape’ is one of the interpretants in
the cascade of interpretants that constitutes the interpretational process.
24 For k>9, there must be states that are degenerately represented. In such states there
is no increase in the approximation of S. We do not come any closer to the generation of
all signs aspects.
25Since, in our opinion, he stacks to much in the concepts (cf. CP 5.475), below we
take from his description only what appears as essential from our perspective.
26We refer to Peirce’s Logic Notebook (Peirce, 1865–1909) through its manuscript
number according to the Robin catalog, MS 339, followed by page number, recto (r) or
verso (v), and date.
27The relation between premises and conclusion may be abductive, inductive or deduc-
tive.
28In fig. 10, the state of Ss or the interpretational system is represented by σj (1≤j≤k).
29For the importance of goal orientation see (Breemen et al., 2007).
30Both kinds of interpretation comply with our model, but since habitual (automatic)
interpretation does not give handles for an analytical treatment, it is not in our focus.
31Proto-signs are a procedural equivalent of sign aspects.
32In conformity with the assumption that qualisigns are independent by definition.
33 The dependencies between the different sign aspects of Peirce’s classification define
an induced partial ordering with the qualisign position as the bottom element.
34Interpretation may fail if the entire input cannot be represented by a single (sentence)
sign.
35We assume nondeterminism to be implemented by backtracking (Aho & Ullman,
1972).
36Note that this laborious procedure is a consequence of the assumed bottom-up flow
of information.
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37Morpho-syntactically complete symbols are given in parentheses. A model for morpho-
syntactic parsing, on the basis of the theory presented in this paper, may be found in
(Farkas, 2008).
38This involved the conceptualization of a non-trivial mathematical problem. 28 ele-
mentary school students took part in the experiment.
39In this experiment, a real-life problem has been analyzed by three clients/stake-
holders, in co-operation with a professional elicitator provided by Sogeti Nederland.
40J.I. Farkas, personal comm., 2009.
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Appendix
A Notes on the secondary literature
A.1 The interpretation of Peirce’s philosophy
From a historical perspective the views on Peirce’s philosophy as a system can be arranged
as follows. In the first phase the question is whether Peirce’s philosophy forms a system.
The editors of the Collected Papers, Feibleman (1960) and Gallie (1966, 1950) hold it
does, Goudge (1950) disagrees by maintaining the thesis that Peirce’s way of thinking is
problem directed and plagued by a dual tendency: transcendentalism vs naturalism. In
the next phase the main question is whether Peirce worked throughout his life on one
system or whether he developed multiple, successive systems. This phase starts, to our
knowledge, with the appearance of an influential book by Murphy (1961). He distinguishes
four systems. Each shift of system is informed, according to him, by developments in
the domain of logic. Apel (1970) follows the path set out by Murphy, but with him
the defining characteristic for what instigates a change is the methodological principle
of pragmatism. Opposing Murphy are those that hold that Peirce’s philosophy must
be looked at as one system in development. Proponents of that view are Rosensohn
(1974) and Esposito (1980). About the nature of the system however opinions vary
considerably. Rosensohn sees a gradual grow towards a system that emerges in 1902 when
Peirce introduces his phenomenology. Esposito holds that a dialectical view on reality and
experience is developed early on and that although the elements of the dialectic change
the underlying form remains the same. So, the three main positions are: 1) There may
well be no system at all, therefore let us start with the investigation of interesting ideas
(Haas, 1964). 2) There are several successive systems (Murphy, 1961), (Short, 2004).
3) Peirce worked throughout his life on one system. An important proponent of that view
is Ransdell (2007). This list of positions may seem neat, but proves to be less helpful
when one realizes that also within the positions there is little consensus as to what are
the defining characteristics.
We are not working on an interpretation of Peirce’s development, but on subject
matters that were important for Peirce and for which Peirce’s work is of paramount
importance. However, if asked for an opinion, we would argue in favor of Ransdell’s
suggestion with regard to Peirce’s research program (research program in the sense of
Lakatos (1970)) while at the same time admitting that Short has a point when he asserts
that there are several successive theories, but we would immediately add that they are
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developed within the same research program. It is against this background that we refer
the reader, interested in an early and detailed treatment of the categories to (Murphy,
1961). The reader interested in the interrelations between Peirce’s architectonic and the
categories, a topic of great interest to our approach, we advise (Parker, 1998).
A.2 The interpretation of Peirce’s semiotic
Since our interpretation of the relation between the two triads of interpretants (the emo-
tional, energetic and logical on the one hand and the immediate, dynamical and normal on
the other) probably will be the most controversial, here we only will superficially indicate
our position against the background of other interpretations proposed.
Emotional
Energetic
Logical
Emotional
Energetic
Logical
Emotional
Energetic
Logical
Immediate
Final
Immediate
Dynamical
Final
Emotional
Energetic
Logical
Immediate
Immediate
Dynamical
Normal
Dynamical
Final
Immediate
Final
Dynamical
Immediate
Emotional
Energetic
Logical
Emotional
Energetic
Logical
Van DrielZemanShortFitzgerald
Figure 20: Four solutions for the relation between the two interpretant trichotomies. The
first three are reconstructed by Bergman, the last is due to van Driel.
Bergman (2004) nicely summarizes the propositions of Fitzgerald (1966), Zeman
(1977) and Short (1981). In fig. 20 we present Bergmans diagrammatic reproduction
of those positions together with the proposal we followed, that of Van Driel (1993). Ze-
man can be looked at as complementary to Van Driel, but is far less explicit. Regrettably,
Van Driel does not give arguments for his way of combining both trichotomies. Proba-
bly because, given his background in language and communication studies, for him it is
evident that the apprehension of the sign as an object should be taken into account. For
Peirce this may well have been less evident given the fact that he did not combine both
trichotomies himself and remarked that:
It seems best to regard a sign as a determination of a quasi-mind; for if we
regard it as an outward object, and as addressing itself to a human mind, that
mind must first apprehend it as an object in itself, and only after that consider
it in its significance; and the like must happen if the sign addresses itself to any
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quasi-mind. It must begin by forming a determination of that quasi-mind, and
nothing will be lost by regarding that determination as the sign. (Peirce, 1992,
1998) Vol.2, p.391.
Lalor (1997) seems to draw a similar conclusion with regard to the way in which both
triads ought to be combined as we do, however with an important difference. Lalor holds
that the emotional, energetic, logical classification reflects the human case, the human
experience of semiosis. We agree that it reflects the experience, the apprehension of the
sign, but we agree with Peirce that it is not here that the difference between semiosis in
humans and artificial or quasi-minds must be looked for. It is for human and quasi minds
alike that both trichotomies must be combined as we do. A significant difference between
processes of semiosis in human and in quasi minds resides in the way in which esthetics
and ethics, the subject of the two normative sciences that precede semiotics, play their
role in the utens of interpretation.
Note that paying attention to the way in which the (quasi)-mind apprehends the
object, calls for an approach in which the process of interpretation is supposed to set off
at the moment a sign inscribes itself in a (quasi)-mind (semiotic sheet). Note also that
in the Van Driel scheme the term normal interpretant is used instead of the term final
interpretant. We agree with Van Driel’s choice of terms because in our opinion the final
interpretant ought to be looked at as the limit to which the normal interpretant tends.
B A definition of ‘naive’ logic
The hierarchy of logical expressions depicted in fig. 21 can be interpreted as a procedure,
generating expressions from other expressions in a recursive fashion. This procedure is
what we call ‘naive’ logic. In this section we introduce this procedure as operations
on expressions interpreted as relations between collections. The initial expressions are
defined by the collections: A, B, ¬A, ¬B. Below, X, Y ∈{A,B} are used as variables
on collections. The operators ‘+’ and ‘∗’ are assumed to be commutative; ‘¬’ is defined
on collections: ¬(X)=¬X, ¬(¬X)=X, as well as operators: ¬(‘∗’)= ‘+’, ¬(‘+’) =‘∗’.
Synonymous expressions are separated from each other by a ‘,’ symbol as usual.
In sorting, the expressions of [qs] and [qe] are generated from the initial expressions:
[qs]=A+B, [qe]=A∗B. This step is trivial.
In abstraction, the expressions of qs and qe are generated from the expressions of [qs]
and [qe], by means of a relative difference operation. Due to the differences between
[qs] and [qe] this requires two versions of this operation, that are designated by “\” and
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A,B,~A,~B
~A+~B,
~A*~B
A is B
A*~B,~A*B
A*BA+B
A+~B,~A+B A*B+~A*~B
A*~B+~A*B
Figure 21: Logical expressions associated with the processing schema
“/” (their definition is given below). For X=Y , X\X as well as X/X are defined by
the empty expression, which can be omitted; for X 6=Y , X\Y and X/Y are identically
defined by X∗¬Y .
In the derivation below, the simultaneity relation included in [qe] is ‘removed’ from
the constituency relation included in [qs](A+B). This operation can be feasible as is
witnessed by the synonymous interpretations of A+B as constituents: A, B, A·B (A·B
is short for ‘both A and B’). Each one of these terms is an expression of a possible
co-existence of A and B. For instance, A is an expression of the input state, co-occurring
with the input effect in the sense of possibility (alternatively, A could be denoted by AB).
In the derivation below, we interpret A·B as A or as B (ambiguously).
qs =[qs]\[qe]
= (A+B)\(A∗B)
= A\(A∗B), B\(A∗B)
= A\A, A\B, B\A, B\B
= A\B, B\A
= A∗¬B, B∗¬A
The other way around, by ‘removing’ the constituency relation included in [qs], from
the simultaneity included in [qe], a relation can be obtained which is less tight than
simultaneity, but more close than constituency. The resulting relation, defined by the final
expression in the derivation of qe below, exhibits the aspect of an exclusive-or relation.
qe = [qe]/[qs]
= (A∗B)/(A+B)
= (A∗B)/A+(A∗B)/B
= A/A+A/B+B/A+B/B
= A∗¬B+B∗¬A
In complementation, the expressions of (qs,C) and (qe,C) are generated by means of
complementation operators (‘¬’) from the expressions of qs and qe (the complementary
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meaning of [C] is represented by complementation as an operations). In the definition
of (qs,C) below, the operand of ‘¬’ is interpreted as a collection of constituents (‘state’
view). For example, the constituents of A∗¬B are ‘A’, ‘¬B’, ‘∗’.
(qs,C) = ¬qs
= ¬(A∗¬B), ¬(¬A∗B)
= (¬A)(¬∗)(¬¬B), (¬¬A)(¬∗)(¬B)
= ¬A+B, A+¬B
This is opposed to the the definition of (qe,C) in which the operand of ‘¬’ is interpreted as
something whole (‘effect’ view). As the existence of an effect always implies the existence
of a state, ‘¬’ can be applied to an expression interpreted as a state or an effect. The two
interpretations are indicated below by means of square brackets and boldface symbols.
For example, in the first term of (i), ‘¬’ is applied to expressions representing a state (A,
¬A); in the second term, it is applied to expressions representing an effect (¬B, B).
(qe,C) = ¬qe
= ¬(A∗¬B+¬A∗B))
= [¬(A∗¬B)+¬(¬A∗B)]+[¬(A∗¬B)+¬(¬A∗B)] (i)
= [(¬A∗¬B)+(¬¬A∗B)]+[(A∗¬¬B)+(¬A∗¬B)]
= A∗B+¬A∗¬B
For the sake of completeness let us mention that the final expression, (qs,C)–(qe,C),
can be formally interpreted as a syllogistic conclusion, defined by the expressions of (qs,C)
and (qe,C) used as premises. In the derivation below we make use of  Lukasiewicz’s con-
ception of a syllogism (Dumitriu, 1977), according to which a premise can be equiva-
lently represented as an implication. The major and minor premises are A∗B+¬A∗¬B=
A+B→A∗B and A→B= A→A+B, respectively, from which A is B syllogistically fol-
lows (by taking A+¬B or A←B as the minor premise, B is A can be obtained; the two
propositions are synonymously representing the logical meaning of the input, in an ‘active’
and a ‘passive’ sense). In the derivation below, quantifiers are omitted.
A+B IS A∗B ;premise 1
A IS A+B ;premise 2
⇒ A IS A∗B ;A→A∗B=¬A+A∗B=¬A+B=A→B
= A IS B
A definition of ‘naive’ logic as a rewriting system or a Boolean algebra is not part
of this book. However, the possibility for a Boolean interpretation of the processing
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schema is illustrated below by derivations indicating a close relationship between some of
the expressions of fig. 21 and syntactically equivalent Boolean relations (this requires an
interpretation of A and B as logical variables which is taken as granted).
For example, the expressions associated with qe can be defined by means of a relative
difference operation on the expressions of [qs] and [qe] this time interpreted as Boolean
relations: (A+B)\(A∗B)= A∗¬B+B∗¬A. The expressions associated with (qs,C) and
(qe,C) can be defined by means of a Boolean negation on the expressions of qs and qe
interpreted as Boolean relations, respectively: ¬(A∗¬B), ¬(¬A∗B)= ¬A+B, A+¬B;
¬(A∗¬B+¬A∗B)= A∗B+¬A∗¬B.
The above close relationship between ‘naive’ and Boolean logic does not hold for the
other expressions and ‘naive’ logical operations, however. From a more general perspec-
tive, Boolean logic can be said to differ from ‘naive’ logic in three aspects. The first is
the uniform representation of the collections of different types of qualia as a universe and
the collections of state and effect qualia as logical variables (Boolean logic). The second
is the interpretation of the logical operations as operations on sets (Boolean logic), not
on different types of collections (‘naive’ logic). The third is the non-synonymous inter-
pretation (Boolean logic) of synonymous expressions (‘naive’ logic), such as A∗¬B and
¬A∗B (cf. fig. 21).
There are other, less important differences between the two systems as well. One of
them is the potential of Boolean logic for a combination of any number of variables and
logical operations in a single expression. This is opposed to the limitations of ‘naive’
logic, capable of establishing relations between two variables at a time and a realization
of operations in an order that is dictated by the order of symbol interactions according
to the processing schema. Finally, the two systems differ in their interpretation of logical
values (true/false), as a representation of the status of cognitive processing (‘naive’ logic)
and a constant value (Boolean logic).
Finally, let us mention the potential of [C] (index) for deductively selecting an actual in-
terpretation from the range of possibilities offered by qs (rheme), as well as its potential for
being tested for qe (legisign) hence inductively generalizing its habitual meaning. Through
this deductive and inductive potential of complementation, the processing schema is capa-
ble of generating the ‘naive’ meaning of ‘∃’ and ‘∀’, respectively, used by ‘naive’ predicate
calculus. A reasoning interpretation of the processing schema may be found in (Farkas,
2008).
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